so low. That is what sub-prime clients do. It is the same reason they cancel their life policies. That does not mean we should stop writing life business because we would be leaving customers and their families exposed.

There is a fundamental issue here. Why sell a client a monthly policy when he has a demonstrated history of not being able to meet his monthly commitments? And guess what? Fact two: sub-prime clients will cancel their monthly ASU policy at the time when they need it the most. Th

THERE has been so much written in the past few months about payment protection insurance it has all become a little confusing. Most of what has been written has been very negative, indeed dangerously negative – witch-hunt proportions even in some quarters. A mortgage magazine even ran a campaign to have single premium accident, sickness, unemployment banned.

Amid all the chest beating and promotion, some clarity is desperately needed. Without relevant PPI being offered to customers, there is an even greater risk of one of the fundamental objectives of the FSA not being met – and that is protecting consumer interests.

The PPI witch-hunt has also lumped together mortgage payment protection insurance and single premium ASU. These products are, of course, all very different. Most of the Office of Fair Trading’s concerns re- volved around the potential mis-selling of PPI related to consumer and revolving credit sales, not mortgages.

In November 2005, the FSA published a report detailing its findings about the sale of PPI. This was backed up with mystery shopping of various firms involved in the sale of PPI – that goes beyond mortgages to other companies that offer revolving lines of credit, store accounts and unsecured loans. It was much broader than the mortgage industry alone and, given the mortgage industry has been regulated by the FSA for some time now, it has taken a disproportionate amount of flak.

Experience

It does strike me as odd that people who have very limited experience in the mortgage market – and more specifically experience in the sub-prime mortgage market – have been pontificating about the so-called evils of single premium ASU.

The mortgage industry as a whole needs to assess the risks and benefits – yes, benefits – of single premium ASU with calm heads, because things have moved on.

Fact one. Sub-prime clients cancel their monthly ASU policies. Some major insurers have even withdrawn the product from sale because the persistency levels are so low. That is what sub-prime clients do. It is the same reason they cancel their life policies. That does not mean we should stop writing life business because we would be leaving customers and their families exposed.

There is a fundamental issue here. Why sell a client a monthly policy when he has a demonstrated history of not being able to meet his monthly commitments? And guess what? Fact two: sub-prime clients will cancel their monthly ASU policy at the time when they need it the most. The

ven greater risk of one of the fundamental objectives of the FSA not being met – and that is protecting consumer interests.

The PPI witch-hunt has also lumped together mortgage payment protection insurance and single premium ASU. These products are, of course, all very different. Most of the Office of Fair Trading’s concerns re- volved around the potential mis-selling of PPI related to consumer and revolving credit sales, not mortgages.

In November 2005, the FSA published a report detailing its findings about the sale of PPI. This was backed up with mystery shopping of various firms involved in the sale of PPI – that goes beyond mortgages to other companies that offer revolving lines of credit, store accounts and unsecured loans. It was much broader than the mortgage industry alone and, given the mortgage industry has been regulated by the FSA for some time now, it has taken a disproportionate amount of flak.

Experience

It does strike me as odd that people who have very limited experience in the mortgage market – and more specifically experience in the sub-prime mortgage market – have been pontificating about the so-called evils of single premium ASU.

The mortgage industry as a whole needs to assess the risks and benefits – yes, benefits – of single premium ASU with calm heads, because things have moved on.

Fact one. Sub-prime clients cancel their monthly ASU policies. Some major insurers have even withdrawn the product from sale because the persistency levels are so low. That is what sub-prime clients do. It is the same reason they cancel their life policies. That does not mean we should stop writing life business because we would be leaving customers and their families exposed.

There is a fundamental issue here. Why sell a client a monthly policy when he has a demonstrated history of not being able to meet his monthly commitments? And guess what? Fact two: sub-prime clients will cancel their monthly ASU policy at the time when they need it the most. Th

its findings about the sale of PPI. This was backed up with mystery shopping of various firms involved in the sale of PPI – that goes beyond mortgages to other companies that offer revolving lines of credit, store accounts and unsecured loans. It was much broader than the mortgage industry alone and, given the mortgage industry has been regulated by the FSA for some time now, it has taken a disproportionate amount of flak.

Experience

It does strike me as odd that people who have very limited experience in the mortgage market – and more specifically experience in the sub-prime mortgage market – have been pontificating about the so-called evils of single premium ASU.

The mortgage industry as a whole needs to assess the risks and benefits – yes, benefits – of single premium ASU with calm heads, because things have moved on.

Fact one. Sub-prime clients cancel their monthly ASU policies. Some major insurers have even withdrawn the product from sale because the persistency levels are so low. That is what sub-prime clients do. It is the same reason they cancel their life policies. That does not mean we should stop writing life business because we would be leaving customers and their families exposed.

There is a fundamental issue here. Why sell a client a monthly policy when he has a demonstrated history of not being able to meet his monthly commitments? And guess what? Fact two: sub-prime clients will cancel their monthly ASU policy at the time when they need it the most. Th

experience in the mortgage market – and more specifically experience in the sub-prime mortgage market – have been pontificating about the so-called evils of single premium ASU.

The mortgage industry as a whole needs to assess the risks and benefits – yes, benefits – of single premium ASU with calm heads, because things have moved on.

Fact one. Sub-prime clients cancel their monthly ASU policies. Some major insurers have even withdrawn the product from sale because the persistency levels are so low. That is what sub-prime clients do. It is the same reason they cancel their life policies. That does not mean we should stop writing life business because we would be leaving customers and their families exposed.

There is a fundamental issue here. Why sell a client a monthly policy when he has a demonstrated history of not being able to meet his monthly commitments? And guess what? Fact two: sub-prime clients will cancel their monthly ASU policy at the time when they need it the most. Th

so low. That is what sub-prime clients do. It is the same reason they cancel their life policies. That does not mean we should stop writing life business because we would be leaving customers and their families exposed.

There is a fundamental issue here. Why sell a client a monthly policy when he has a demonstrated history of not being able to meet his monthly commitments? And guess what? Fact two: sub-prime clients will cancel their monthly ASU policy at the time when they need it the most. The potential ramifications for the IFA/mortgage broker are dire should he be unable to demonstrate that he offered his client the option of either monthly or single premium ASU and it has subsequently gone pear shaped for his client.

Some brokers detail the costs and benefits of ASU in the suitability letter and document in that letter if the client has chosen not to take it up. Some go even further. For clients who cancel their policies downstream, some brokers send a disclaimer ensuring they know what they are cancelling and detail the ramifications of having no cover.

It is cheaper to do that than risk the potential of attracting a lawsuit, and worse still drawing bad press to our business and brand. There is no doubt that single premium ASU policies have come in for some major flak because of their poor flexibility and TCF unfriendliness.

Commission

Agreed and rightly so. One of the key issues at play here is the seemingly large commission payments made for single premium ASU.

Let us look at that issue in another context. What if a motor insurer offered a three-year product and guaranteed not to change price over the term with no inflationary creep? What if you got a further discount for paying that policy upfront as a lump sum? Of course, the selling broker would be paid his share of the total premium.

Single premium ASU is not really that different; it is just that a lot of commentators have got all bent out of shape about the commission payment and not the cover itself.

This problem has been further magnified by lots of people throwing their twopence into the ring when, to be frank, objectivity is needed and recognition of what has changed. There is a place for single premium ASU, but not as we used to know it.

What if the mortgage industry had a single premium ASU product that had the following features:

- provided no quibble pro-rata refunds if it was cancelled; - where the premium was established using a risk matrix factoring in age