.S. effort to devise a coherent strategy for "retaking" Iraq and a willingness to inject the substantial manpower to do so (it won't happen given political realities), and U.S. willingness to stand up for a UN Security Council follow-up resolution that paves the way for the disarming of Hezbollah as an alternative to allowing the situation in Lebanon to slide back to the status quo ante, the stark reality is that the balance of power in the region is tilting toward Iran and away from the U.S. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was a counterweight to Iran. That counterweight is gone. Worse, it is now evolving in a direction that expedites Iran's With Campaign 2006 gaining momentum, the situation in Iraq is likely to be a focal point of the crossfire between candidates and political parties. Among the centerpiece items could be whether or not the U.S. should withdraw from Iraq. After the election, the rhetoric will diminish and an approach that differs little from the status quo will continue.

Near-term withdrawal from Iraq might gain votes, but it could lead to an even more dangerous situation in Iraq and the Middle East. Following any near-term U.S. withdrawal, sectarian strife would continue or increase, at least for a time. In response, Iraq's Shia-dominated government would accelerate its evolution down an illiberal path. It would likely grow increasingly authoritarian and anti-Western.

In addition, Iran's influence would increase rapidly and Iraq might potentially become a de facto Iranian satellite. Already, Chatham House, a leading British think tank has declared that Iran “has now superseded the U.S. as the most influential power” in Iraq. With an enlarged influence in Iraq, Iran would then be in a much better position to dominate the Persian Gulf. In the absence of a credible energy policy that moves the U.S. away from oil dependency, that development would create new lines of vulnerability for the U.S.

Even as the U.S. persists in seeking to produce some kind of better outcome in Iraq than had been the case under Saddam Hussein’s rule, the U.S. experience in Iraq has been troubling from a geopolitical standpoint. Far from the early expectations that there would be "shock and awe" from a demonstration of U.S. power, on account of the experience to date, America's enemies are more in shock over how impotent the U.S. Military appears to be in spite of its enormous technology/manpower advantages, and in awe of how far the Sunni and radical Shia insurgencies have progressed.

On account of the U.S. experience in Iraq, Iran's confidence to pursue its interests—which are largely at odds with critical U.S. ones—has been bolstered. Iran has gained significant influence relative to the U.S. in Iraq through just a small investment of money, manpower, and arms. The facts that Iraq's Prime Minister all but backed Hezbollah in the recent combat in Lebanon in defiance of U.S. strategic interests and Moqtada al-Sadr operates with impunity in building an ever larger radical pro-Iranian movement (which undermines the leverage of Shia moderates such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani who are more sympathetic to U.S. interests) speak for themselves.

Barring a meaningful U.S. effort to devise a coherent strategy for "retaking" Iraq and a willingness to inject the substantial manpower to do so (it won't happen given political realities), and U.S. willingness to stand up for a UN Security Council follow-up resolution that paves the way for the disarming of Hezbollah as an alternative to allowing the situation in Lebanon to slide back to the status quo ante, the stark reality is that the balance of power in the region is tilting toward Iran and away from the U.S. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was a counterweight to Iran. That counterweight is gone. Worse, it is now evolving in a direction that expedites Iran's a

ould accelerate its evolution down an illiberal path. It would likely grow increasingly authoritarian and anti-Western.

In addition, Iran's influence would increase rapidly and Iraq might potentially become a de facto Iranian satellite. Already, Chatham House, a leading British think tank has declared that Iran “has now superseded the U.S. as the most influential power” in Iraq. With an enlarged influence in Iraq, Iran would then be in a much better position to dominate the Persian Gulf. In the absence of a credible energy policy that moves the U.S. away from oil dependency, that development would create new lines of vulnerability for the U.S.

Even as the U.S. persists in seeking to produce some kind of better outcome in Iraq than had been the case under Saddam Hussein’s rule, the U.S. experience in Iraq has been troubling from a geopolitical standpoint. Far from the early expectations that there would be "shock and awe" from a demonstration of U.S. power, on account of the experience to date, America's enemies are more in shock over how impotent the U.S. Military appears to be in spite of its enormous technology/manpower advantages, and in awe of how far the Sunni and radical Shia insurgencies have progressed.

On account of the U.S. experience in Iraq, Iran's confidence to pursue its interests—which are largely at odds with critical U.S. ones—has been bolstered. Iran has gained significant influence relative to the U.S. in Iraq through just a small investment of money, manpower, and arms. The facts that Iraq's Prime Minister all but backed Hezbollah in the recent combat in Lebanon in defiance of U.S. strategic interests and Moqtada al-Sadr operates with impunity in building an ever larger radical pro-Iranian movement (which undermines the leverage of Shia moderates such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani who are more sympathetic to U.S. interests) speak for themselves.

Barring a meaningful U.S. effort to devise a coherent strategy for "retaking" Iraq and a willingness to inject the substantial manpower to do so (it won't happen given political realities), and U.S. willingness to stand up for a UN Security Council follow-up resolution that paves the way for the disarming of Hezbollah as an alternative to allowing the situation in Lebanon to slide back to the status quo ante, the stark reality is that the balance of power in the region is tilting toward Iran and away from the U.S. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was a counterweight to Iran. That counterweight is gone. Worse, it is now evolving in a direction that expedites Iran's

r the U.S.

Even as the U.S. persists in seeking to produce some kind of better outcome in Iraq than had been the case under Saddam Hussein’s rule, the U.S. experience in Iraq has been troubling from a geopolitical standpoint. Far from the early expectations that there would be "shock and awe" from a demonstration of U.S. power, on account of the experience to date, America's enemies are more in shock over how impotent the U.S. Military appears to be in spite of its enormous technology/manpower advantages, and in awe of how far the Sunni and radical Shia insurgencies have progressed.

On account of the U.S. experience in Iraq, Iran's confidence to pursue its interests—which are largely at odds with critical U.S. ones—has been bolstered. Iran has gained significant influence relative to the U.S. in Iraq through just a small investment of money, manpower, and arms. The facts that Iraq's Prime Minister all but backed Hezbollah in the recent combat in Lebanon in defiance of U.S. strategic interests and Moqtada al-Sadr operates with impunity in building an ever larger radical pro-Iranian movement (which undermines the leverage of Shia moderates such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani who are more sympathetic to U.S. interests) speak for themselves.

Barring a meaningful U.S. effort to devise a coherent strategy for "retaking" Iraq and a willingness to inject the substantial manpower to do so (it won't happen given political realities), and U.S. willingness to stand up for a UN Security Council follow-up resolution that paves the way for the disarming of Hezbollah as an alternative to allowing the situation in Lebanon to slide back to the status quo ante, the stark reality is that the balance of power in the region is tilting toward Iran and away from the U.S. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was a counterweight to Iran. That counterweight is gone. Worse, it is now evolving in a direction that expedites Iran's

an's confidence to pursue its interests—which are largely at odds with critical U.S. ones—has been bolstered. Iran has gained significant influence relative to the U.S. in Iraq through just a small investment of money, manpower, and arms. The facts that Iraq's Prime Minister all but backed Hezbollah in the recent combat in Lebanon in defiance of U.S. strategic interests and Moqtada al-Sadr operates with impunity in building an ever larger radical pro-Iranian movement (which undermines the leverage of Shia moderates such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani who are more sympathetic to U.S. interests) speak for themselves.

Barring a meaningful U.S. effort to devise a coherent strategy for "retaking" Iraq and a willingness to inject the substantial manpower to do so (it won't happen given political realities), and U.S. willingness to stand up for a UN Security Council follow-up resolution that paves the way for the disarming of Hezbollah as an alternative to allowing the situation in Lebanon to slide back to the status quo ante, the stark reality is that the balance of power in the region is tilting toward Iran and away from the U.S. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was a counterweight to Iran. That counterweight is gone. Worse, it is now evolving in a direction that expedites Iran's

.S. effort to devise a coherent strategy for "retaking" Iraq and a willingness to inject the substantial manpower to do so (it won't happen given political realities), and U.S. willingness to stand up for a UN Security Council follow-up resolution that paves the way for the disarming of Hezbollah as an alternative to allowing the situation in Lebanon to slide back to the status quo ante, the stark reality is that the balance of power in the region is tilting toward Iran and away from the U.S. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was a counterweight to Iran. That counterweight is gone. Worse, it is now evolving in a direction that expedites Iran's ability to achieve its regional aspirations.

The uninspiring U.S. performance in Iraq—a multitude of reasons are responsible including, but not limited to, a lack of planning, lack of understanding of Iraq's history, lack of military capacity to deal with guerrilla warfare, strategic errors, for example, not apprehending Moqtada al-Sadr when an arrest warrant had been issued and the United States’ failure to ensure a liberal constitution for Iraqis, unlike what General MacArthur did in Japan—has created perceptions that can only embolden would-be aggressors and terrorists.

Against that backdrop, Iran is sufficiently bold to call UN Security Council Resolution 1696 (aimed at achieving Iranian compliance with the international community's demands to halt its nuclear activities by August 31) "unlawful." It has continued to push ahead with its program and pledged to accelerate its activities. It has openly supported Hezbollah and its President has continued to call for Israel's elimination.

Iran has calculated that the West cannot harm it. The West won't curb Iran's ability to sell oil, even as oil revenue accounts for 80% of Iran's export income and generates 50% of its federal revenue. The West is too weak to sacrifice is Iran's thinking. As Iran sees it, if the U.S. can't handle Iraq's insurgency, it most definitely can't deal with a much larger one should it try to invade Iran, hence there won't be any invasion.

If Iraq is beyond fixing or, more accurately, the U.S. lacks the will, desire, or ability to "fix" the already bad situation there, then withdrawal would arguably be a viable approach. Such a move would be highly popular among the American public per recent polling. However, it would also send powerful confirmation to Iran that its calculations are, in fact, correct. In addition, it would signal to the broader radical Islamist terrorist movement that the U.S. has become the "paper tiger" they long believed it is. Weakness invites aggression and that scenario could be quite ugly for U.S. interests.

Therefore, the decision on that issue has become one of pitting critical U.S. interests against U.S. public desires. The public has lost faith in the U.S. ability to carry out the task successfully and may well be beyond persuasion. It feels betrayed that it was led to believe things were going much better in Iraq and the kind of outcomes that would then be expected to materialize from such progress are never achieved. The recent data showing 100+ deaths per day in Iraq during July shattered any illusions that t