support or potential support of all sectors of the population. The only area, where it is supported generally, is the Kurdish area, where they have done so, in order to defend and maintain their virtual independence and because al-Hakim has supported them over a referendum on the status Kirkuk. That said, there is still growing suspicion among Kurds over the question of a Shia “super region,” which would increase overall Shiite power in Iraq and perhaps cause problems on wealth sharing and other questions at a national level. They would probably prefer, if possible, to keep to a much weaker form of federalism for the Shia and Sunni regions. Yet, at the same time the status quo is beginning to eat away at the fringes of the Kurdish region and the disputed mixed belt around its border. Mosul faces escalating violence and Kirkuk is on the verge of civil war. It is increasingly obvious that “Kurdistan” cannot remain hermetically sealed from events infecting the rest of the country.

But despite Kurdish support, if the concept of federalism fails to win support among the Sunnis, then it is unworkable as a national strategy. And why should the Sunnis support the creation of Shia “super region”? Clearly, their present fears of discrimination and punish

Would Federalization Work?

Even if federalism isn’t a mass grassroots movement today, it could become one, and, for the moment, it remains the main political kid on the block. Again the reason for this is that arguing for a return to dictatorship or the prospect for all-out war that independence would bring is difficult. At the same time, the status quo is equally difficult to defend. So something has to be put forward and federalism is the most suitable to the machinations of the opportunistic politicians.

The simple, demagogic argument of al-Hakim in favor of federalism is to point to the success of Kurdish autonomy. It is demagogy because he well knows that the situation in “Kurdistan” is quite different from other parts of the country. The Kurdish autonomous regional government has been successful for five key reasons, which differentiate it from the rest of the country (until now.) These are:

1) The greater ethnic and religious homogeneity of the region;
2) the independent economic potential of the oil revenues;
3) the lack of factionalism deriving from the long, historical, social solidarity formed in the struggle for independence;
4) greater socio-economic stability and unity; and finally,
5) these factors have allowed the region to have a more stable state apparatus with a popular government and security forces.

Some of the factors, especially 1. and 2. have also been partially present in the oil rich Shiite south, which until now has experienced relatively less violence than Baghdad or the Sunni regions. Yet in the South, political in-fighting and the consequent disruption of the economy have now reached dangerous levels, which threaten to spiral into internecine levels of factional warfare and auto-destruction. Al-Hakim can make the simple point that if the current democratic structures are done away with (since they don’t function any way,) then a new super, single governate of all provinces could bring peace and prosperity. This allows him to play on the legitimate frustration and disgust with both the local political militia factionalism and the central government. Put at its bluntest “you have everything the north has economically and more, all you need is the same autonomy and peace and prosperity is yours.”

This is simply a lie. The problem is not whether the Shias have a “super region” or not. The Kurdish area is not a “super region” on this model. It is run on the basis of the same governate, decentralized democracy that the Shiites have in place. It is not one great centralized region where the governates have been abolished. They co-exist with a regional authority, army and police. The key difference is that there isn’t the same level of political factionalism and militia rivalry that bedevils the south, and which is precisely the product of the machinations of politicians like al-Hakim. Shiite “federalism” is simply a dangerous attempt by opportunistic Shiite politicians to divert attention from their own failings and growing unpopularity, and to make up for this by demagogically winning an advantage over their rivals.

Nevertheless, in the absence of other alternatives the argument could catch on. But its potential appeal is limited to the Shiite south, because Baghdad and the mixed Shia/Sunni areas benefit from none of the advantages enjoyed by the Kurdish region, and, moreover, suffer from much of the militia misrule and factionalism found in the south. Their economies are in ruins. The level of violence is unprecedented and people live in a regime of constant terror from bomb attacks and sectarian murders. On top of this, there is ethnic cleansing, which is resulting in huge disruption of demographics and social cohesion. Literally hundreds of thousands of people are on the move, living in desperation without homes and jobs and providing a pool of recruitment for the insurgents and militias. Indeed, the whole fabric of society is in tatters.

The purely Sunni areas are if anything worse. They have little or no independent economic resources and lack any perspectives for the future. Once favored under the old regime, these areas are now becoming provincial ghettoes. Furthermore, they are practically lawless. The old state machinery has collapsed and has been replaced by the rule of the different insurgents and tribal chiefs. While there is now some cooperation between some insurgent groups, but the unity is only preserved by the need for extra combined forces against the common occupying US enemy. Rivalry is still fierce and ideological divisions stretch from Baathists and nationalists across the spectrum of groups to Al Qaeda. People mostly hanker for the days of the old regime and hope for a share in a unitary Iraq for economic reasons. But, at the same time, they live in distrust and dread of Shia domination and potential victimization and revenge for the past crimes of the old pro-Sunni regimes.

The first thing that has to be said about the workability of any proposal is that it has to have the support or potential support of all sectors of the population. The only area, where it is supported generally, is the Kurdish area, where they have done so, in order to defend and maintain their virtual independence and because al-Hakim has supported them over a referendum on the status Kirkuk. That said, there is still growing suspicion among Kurds over the question of a Shia “super region,” which would increase overall Shiite power in Iraq and perhaps cause problems on wealth sharing and other questions at a national level. They would probably prefer, if possible, to keep to a much weaker form of federalism for the Shia and Sunni regions. Yet, at the same time the status quo is beginning to eat away at the fringes of the Kurdish region and the disputed mixed belt around its border. Mosul faces escalating violence and Kirkuk is on the verge of civil war. It is increasingly obvious that “Kurdistan” cannot remain hermetically sealed from events infecting the rest of the country.

But despite Kurdish support, if the concept of federalism fails to win support among the Sunnis, then it is unworkable as a national strategy. And why should the Sunnis support the creation of Shia “super region”? Clearly, their present fears of discrimination and punishm

ors have allowed the region to have a more stable state apparatus with a popular government and security forces.

Some of the factors, especially 1. and 2. have also been partially present in the oil rich Shiite south, which until now has experienced relatively less violence than Baghdad or the Sunni regions. Yet in the South, political in-fighting and the consequent disruption of the economy have now reached dangerous levels, which threaten to spiral into internecine levels of factional warfare and auto-destruction. Al-Hakim can make the simple point that if the current democratic structures are done away with (since they don’t function any way,) then a new super, single governate of all provinces could bring peace and prosperity. This allows him to play on the legitimate frustration and disgust with both the local political militia factionalism and the central government. Put at its bluntest “you have everything the north has economically and more, all you need is the same autonomy and peace and prosperity is yours.”

This is simply a lie. The problem is not whether the Shias have a “super region” or not. The Kurdish area is not a “super region” on this model. It is run on the basis of the same governate, decentralized democracy that the Shiites have in place. It is not one great centralized region where the governates have been abolished. They co-exist with a regional authority, army and police. The key difference is that there isn’t the same level of political factionalism and militia rivalry that bedevils the south, and which is precisely the product of the machinations of politicians like al-Hakim. Shiite “federalism” is simply a dangerous attempt by opportunistic Shiite politicians to divert attention from their own failings and growing unpopularity, and to make up for this by demagogically winning an advantage over their rivals.

Nevertheless, in the absence of other alternatives the argument could catch on. But its potential appeal is limited to the Shiite south, because Baghdad and the mixed Shia/Sunni areas benefit from none of the advantages enjoyed by the Kurdish region, and, moreover, suffer from much of the militia misrule and factionalism found in the south. Their economies are in ruins. The level of violence is unprecedented and people live in a regime of constant terror from bomb attacks and sectarian murders. On top of this, there is ethnic cleansing, which is resulting in huge disruption of demographics and social cohesion. Literally hundreds of thousands of people are on the move, living in desperation without homes and jobs and providing a pool of recruitment for the insurgents and militias. Indeed, the whole fabric of society is in tatters.

The purely Sunni areas are if anything worse. They have little or no independent economic resources and lack any perspectives for the future. Once favored under the old regime, these areas are now becoming provincial ghettoes. Furthermore, they are practically lawless. The old state machinery has collapsed and has been replaced by the rule of the different insurgents and tribal chiefs. While there is now some cooperation between some insurgent groups, but the unity is only preserved by the need for extra combined forces against the common occupying US enemy. Rivalry is still fierce and ideological divisions stretch from Baathists and nationalists across the spectrum of groups to Al Qaeda. People mostly hanker for the days of the old regime and hope for a share in a unitary Iraq for economic reasons. But, at the same time, they live in distrust and dread of Shia domination and potential victimization and revenge for the past crimes of the old pro-Sunni regimes.

The first thing that has to be said about the workability of any proposal is that it has to have the support or potential support of all sectors of the population. The only area, where it is supported generally, is the Kurdish area, where they have done so, in order to defend and maintain their virtual independence and because al-Hakim has supported them over a referendum on the status Kirkuk. That said, there is still growing suspicion among Kurds over the question of a Shia “super region,” which would increase overall Shiite power in Iraq and perhaps cause problems on wealth sharing and other questions at a national level. They would probably prefer, if possible, to keep to a much weaker form of federalism for the Shia and Sunni regions. Yet, at the same time the status quo is beginning to eat away at the fringes of the Kurdish region and the disputed mixed belt around its border. Mosul faces escalating violence and Kirkuk is on the verge of civil war. It is increasingly obvious that “Kurdistan” cannot remain hermetically sealed from events infecting the rest of the country.

But despite Kurdish support, if the concept of federalism fails to win support among the Sunnis, then it is unworkable as a national strategy. And why should the Sunnis support the creation of Shia “super region”? Clearly, their present fears of discrimination and punish

hiites have in place. It is not one great centralized region where the governates have been abolished. They co-exist with a regional authority, army and police. The key difference is that there isn’t the same level of political factionalism and militia rivalry that bedevils the south, and which is precisely the product of the machinations of politicians like al-Hakim. Shiite “federalism” is simply a dangerous attempt by opportunistic Shiite politicians to divert attention from their own failings and growing unpopularity, and to make up for this by demagogically winning an advantage over their rivals.

Nevertheless, in the absence of other alternatives the argument could catch on. But its potential appeal is limited to the Shiite south, because Baghdad and the mixed Shia/Sunni areas benefit from none of the advantages enjoyed by the Kurdish region, and, moreover, suffer from much of the militia misrule and factionalism found in the south. Their economies are in ruins. The level of violence is unprecedented and people live in a regime of constant terror from bomb attacks and sectarian murders. On top of this, there is ethnic cleansing, which is resulting in huge disruption of demographics and social cohesion. Literally hundreds of thousands of people are on the move, living in desperation without homes and jobs and providing a pool of recruitment for the insurgents and militias. Indeed, the whole fabric of society is in tatters.

The purely Sunni areas are if anything worse. They have little or no independent economic resources and lack any perspectives for the future. Once favored under the old regime, these areas are now becoming provincial ghettoes. Furthermore, they are practically lawless. The old state machinery has collapsed and has been replaced by the rule of the different insurgents and tribal chiefs. While there is now some cooperation between some insurgent groups, but the unity is only preserved by the need for extra combined forces against the common occupying US enemy. Rivalry is still fierce and ideological divisions stretch from Baathists and nationalists across the spectrum of groups to Al Qaeda. People mostly hanker for the days of the old regime and hope for a share in a unitary Iraq for economic reasons. But, at the same time, they live in distrust and dread of Shia domination and potential victimization and revenge for the past crimes of the old pro-Sunni regimes.

The first thing that has to be said about the workability of any proposal is that it has to have the support or potential support of all sectors of the population. The only area, where it is supported generally, is the Kurdish area, where they have done so, in order to defend and maintain their virtual independence and because al-Hakim has supported them over a referendum on the status Kirkuk. That said, there is still growing suspicion among Kurds over the question of a Shia “super region,” which would increase overall Shiite power in Iraq and perhaps cause problems on wealth sharing and other questions at a national level. They would probably prefer, if possible, to keep to a much weaker form of federalism for the Shia and Sunni regions. Yet, at the same time the status quo is beginning to eat away at the fringes of the Kurdish region and the disputed mixed belt around its border. Mosul faces escalating violence and Kirkuk is on the verge of civil war. It is increasingly obvious that “Kurdistan” cannot remain hermetically sealed from events infecting the rest of the country.

But despite Kurdish support, if the concept of federalism fails to win support among the Sunnis, then it is unworkable as a national strategy. And why should the Sunnis support the creation of Shia “super region”? Clearly, their present fears of discrimination and punish

e are on the move, living in desperation without homes and jobs and providing a pool of recruitment for the insurgents and militias. Indeed, the whole fabric of society is in tatters.

The purely Sunni areas are if anything worse. They have little or no independent economic resources and lack any perspectives for the future. Once favored under the old regime, these areas are now becoming provincial ghettoes. Furthermore, they are practically lawless. The old state machinery has collapsed and has been replaced by the rule of the different insurgents and tribal chiefs. While there is now some cooperation between some insurgent groups, but the unity is only preserved by the need for extra combined forces against the common occupying US enemy. Rivalry is still fierce and ideological divisions stretch from Baathists and nationalists across the spectrum of groups to Al Qaeda. People mostly hanker for the days of the old regime and hope for a share in a unitary Iraq for economic reasons. But, at the same time, they live in distrust and dread of Shia domination and potential victimization and revenge for the past crimes of the old pro-Sunni regimes.

The first thing that has to be said about the workability of any proposal is that it has to have the support or potential support of all sectors of the population. The only area, where it is supported generally, is the Kurdish area, where they have done so, in order to defend and maintain their virtual independence and because al-Hakim has supported them over a referendum on the status Kirkuk. That said, there is still growing suspicion among Kurds over the question of a Shia “super region,” which would increase overall Shiite power in Iraq and perhaps cause problems on wealth sharing and other questions at a national level. They would probably prefer, if possible, to keep to a much weaker form of federalism for the Shia and Sunni regions. Yet, at the same time the status quo is beginning to eat away at the fringes of the Kurdish region and the disputed mixed belt around its border. Mosul faces escalating violence and Kirkuk is on the verge of civil war. It is increasingly obvious that “Kurdistan” cannot remain hermetically sealed from events infecting the rest of the country.

But despite Kurdish support, if the concept of federalism fails to win support among the Sunnis, then it is unworkable as a national strategy. And why should the Sunnis support the creation of Shia “super region”? Clearly, their present fears of discrimination and punish

support or potential support of all sectors of the population. The only area, where it is supported generally, is the Kurdish area, where they have done so, in order to defend and maintain their virtual independence and because al-Hakim has supported them over a referendum on the status Kirkuk. That said, there is still growing suspicion among Kurds over the question of a Shia “super region,” which would increase overall Shiite power in Iraq and perhaps cause problems on wealth sharing and other questions at a national level. They would probably prefer, if possible, to keep to a much weaker form of federalism for the Shia and Sunni regions. Yet, at the same time the status quo is beginning to eat away at the fringes of the Kurdish region and the disputed mixed belt around its border. Mosul faces escalating violence and Kirkuk is on the verge of civil war. It is increasingly obvious that “Kurdistan” cannot remain hermetically sealed from events infecting the rest of the country.

But despite Kurdish support, if the concept of federalism fails to win support among the Sunnis, then it is unworkable as a national strategy. And why should the Sunnis support the creation of Shia “super region”? Clearly, their present fears of discrimination and punishment for the past will be even more poignant. Any lingering hope or confidence in the national government would evaporate. At the very least, if a movement for separation didn’t develop, then they would demand their own “super region.” This would mean a battle for every inch of disputed, mixed territory stretching from the Syrian border to Iran and right up north into the borderlands of the Kurdish region.

The Sectarian Role of the United States.
Bereft of new ideas for a new epoch, the US is falling back on the old methods of British Imperialism in divide and rule and the sectarian tactics to deal with counter-insurgence. In particular, they are surreptitiously turning to a method, which was successfully employed in Malaysia.

There the British forsook support among the population, as a whole, for leaning on the support of one ethnic group against another, in order to defeat the insurgents. The US and UK are now doing the same with the Shias in Iraq. Behind the crackdown on Shia militias lies a deal struck with Maliki and al-Hakim (and, indeed even with Muqtada al-Sadr) to crush all Shia militia opposition to them, in return for their unequivocal support for the surge. After it is all over, Maliki and Hakim will be handed the Iraqi Army and police as part of their private army. As we go to press, British forces, together with army units sympathetic to Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his Badr Brigades have attacked the incumbent Fadhila party, in an effort to hand Hakim the prize of Iraq’s second city of Basra. Under the cloak of crushing “criminal elements,” all “unreliable” Shia militias are being first moped up, before a real offensive is begun against the Sunni insurgents.

The reason is the US cannot lean upon the Shia majority, if it is not first stable and reliable. Once they have secured a loyal Shia “maharajah,” they don’t have to keep looking over their shoulders, while attacking Sunni insurgents. The American will then crush the Sunnis for the Shias. They will break the back of Sunni morale, crushing all who cannot be bought off and leaving Maliki and al-Hakim free to introduce their form of “federalism.”

Similar style efforts are being tried with regard to Sunni collaborators. The American Ambassador and aids are busy at work discussing with tribal and insurgent Sunnis to strike a similar deal, which will then free the US them to focus on Al Qaeda. But this is less likely to work, as they are weaker than Hakim and the US has little plausible to promise them in return

So while the Iraqi government throws dust in eyes of the world, talking of criminals and terrorists, the idea goes that the rank and file militants will be moped up and sectarian killings and insurgency will be brought down to minimum, “acceptable “ levels. The US will be able to withdraw with a face-saving solution and will be long gone by the time Iraq reaps the whirlwind, when sectarianism and insurgency recovers enough to plunge Iraq into a new all-out civil war. Or so the plan goes.

Next. Part 3 - Federation or Confederation