ng self-generated movement. In essence, young children can understand that animate objects have the ability to move deliberately and independently, whereas the movement of inanimate objects must involve the actions of an external force. For example, 3 and 4 year olds were able to look at pictures from two animate categories (mammals and non-mammals) and three inanimate categories (statues, wheeled objects and complex rigid objects) and successfully state which would be able to move up and down a hill on their own (Massey and Gelman, 1988). The animate/inanimate distinction made here was based on more than simple perceptual information, as the animate objects were never pictured moving, and their legs were seldom evident. Moreover, of the inanimate objects the statues displayed many of the same perceptual categories as the animate objects. One implication of the findings from all of these moOne of the core techniques that children employ in understanding the nature of things is that of recognizing distinguishing characteristics in them, which allows categorization of said items based on the sharing of these characteristics. In so doing they can create a mental database, allowing an object to be quickly compared to others with similar characteristics and so the individual can infer much information (about function and behavior, etc) onto a relatively unknown stimuli. This allows children to more quickly adapt to new objects they encounter and to select what action is most appropriate. Few of these categorical distinctions are as important to young children's understanding of the world as the animate/inanimate distinction. It shows that they have the ability to separate perceptual and conceptual information of form and function and use it to discern if an object is living, or if it is merely an artifact. There is some argument as to whether the existence of this distinction is, to any extent, innate, or if it is an example of acquired learning. Either way, its existence has a number of possible implications, such as the support it gives to views regarding the acquisition of biological knowledge.

Rakison and Butterworth (1998) showed that categorization in early infants and neonates is purely 'perceptual', or based on basic physical features (such as 'animals have legs, vehicles have wheels'). By the end of the first year, categorical reasoning has become much more strongly 'conceptual', being based on common function and behavior. At this point distinctions can be made where perceptual contrast has been minimized. Therefore it is at this point that the child can be seen to make the first proper animate/inanimate distinctions. They have been shown to understand that visually similar items such as (birds and airplanes) are still categorically different due to the biological nature of one and the artificial nature of the other (Mandler and McDonough, 1998).

In order to fully explore the extent to which children understand the animate/inanimate distinction, it is necessary to look at the various aspects which seem to make it up. These include evidence from studies of movement, growth and internal properties of animate and inanimate objects (Goswami, 1998). A number of experiments have been carried out to show that children can distinguish between animate and inanimate movement patterns, and these have shown that such a distinction is present in infants as young as 5 months old. In one such experiment light points were attached to all human limbs and the movement pattern of these (including all naturally occurring occlusions) were mapped onto a computer. These were then presented in series along with the same movement patterns minus occlusions, and random light patterns (with and without occlusions). Using a habituation/dishabituation system of analysis it was shown that these young infants recognized the human movement as distinct from the other movements shown (Bertenthal et al, 1985). Predictability and regularity have also been shown to form the basis of children's understanding of the distinction between animate and inanimate movement patterns. Lamsfuss (1995) showed 4 and 5 year olds a series of pairs of dot patterns, one regular and one irregular, that they said were tracks left by either animals or machines. The children were shown to make the same correct responses as the adults and biology experts in the control condition.

Experiments have also shown that children can make the animate/inanimate distinction regarding self-generated movement. In essence, young children can understand that animate objects have the ability to move deliberately and independently, whereas the movement of inanimate objects must involve the actions of an external force. For example, 3 and 4 year olds were able to look at pictures from two animate categories (mammals and non-mammals) and three inanimate categories (statues, wheeled objects and complex rigid objects) and successfully state which would be able to move up and down a hill on their own (Massey and Gelman, 1988). The animate/inanimate distinction made here was based on more than simple perceptual information, as the animate objects were never pictured moving, and their legs were seldom evident. Moreover, of the inanimate objects the statues displayed many of the same perceptual categories as the animate objects. One implication of the findings from all of these mov

it is merely an artifact. There is some argument as to whether the existence of this distinction is, to any extent, innate, or if it is an example of acquired learning. Either way, its existence has a number of possible implications, such as the support it gives to views regarding the acquisition of biological knowledge.

Rakison and Butterworth (1998) showed that categorization in early infants and neonates is purely 'perceptual', or based on basic physical features (such as 'animals have legs, vehicles have wheels'). By the end of the first year, categorical reasoning has become much more strongly 'conceptual', being based on common function and behavior. At this point distinctions can be made where perceptual contrast has been minimized. Therefore it is at this point that the child can be seen to make the first proper animate/inanimate distinctions. They have been shown to understand that visually similar items such as (birds and airplanes) are still categorically different due to the biological nature of one and the artificial nature of the other (Mandler and McDonough, 1998).

In order to fully explore the extent to which children understand the animate/inanimate distinction, it is necessary to look at the various aspects which seem to make it up. These include evidence from studies of movement, growth and internal properties of animate and inanimate objects (Goswami, 1998). A number of experiments have been carried out to show that children can distinguish between animate and inanimate movement patterns, and these have shown that such a distinction is present in infants as young as 5 months old. In one such experiment light points were attached to all human limbs and the movement pattern of these (including all naturally occurring occlusions) were mapped onto a computer. These were then presented in series along with the same movement patterns minus occlusions, and random light patterns (with and without occlusions). Using a habituation/dishabituation system of analysis it was shown that these young infants recognized the human movement as distinct from the other movements shown (Bertenthal et al, 1985). Predictability and regularity have also been shown to form the basis of children's understanding of the distinction between animate and inanimate movement patterns. Lamsfuss (1995) showed 4 and 5 year olds a series of pairs of dot patterns, one regular and one irregular, that they said were tracks left by either animals or machines. The children were shown to make the same correct responses as the adults and biology experts in the control condition.

Experiments have also shown that children can make the animate/inanimate distinction regarding self-generated movement. In essence, young children can understand that animate objects have the ability to move deliberately and independently, whereas the movement of inanimate objects must involve the actions of an external force. For example, 3 and 4 year olds were able to look at pictures from two animate categories (mammals and non-mammals) and three inanimate categories (statues, wheeled objects and complex rigid objects) and successfully state which would be able to move up and down a hill on their own (Massey and Gelman, 1988). The animate/inanimate distinction made here was based on more than simple perceptual information, as the animate objects were never pictured moving, and their legs were seldom evident. Moreover, of the inanimate objects the statues displayed many of the same perceptual categories as the animate objects. One implication of the findings from all of these mo

d that visually similar items such as (birds and airplanes) are still categorically different due to the biological nature of one and the artificial nature of the other (Mandler and McDonough, 1998).

In order to fully explore the extent to which children understand the animate/inanimate distinction, it is necessary to look at the various aspects which seem to make it up. These include evidence from studies of movement, growth and internal properties of animate and inanimate objects (Goswami, 1998). A number of experiments have been carried out to show that children can distinguish between animate and inanimate movement patterns, and these have shown that such a distinction is present in infants as young as 5 months old. In one such experiment light points were attached to all human limbs and the movement pattern of these (including all naturally occurring occlusions) were mapped onto a computer. These were then presented in series along with the same movement patterns minus occlusions, and random light patterns (with and without occlusions). Using a habituation/dishabituation system of analysis it was shown that these young infants recognized the human movement as distinct from the other movements shown (Bertenthal et al, 1985). Predictability and regularity have also been shown to form the basis of children's understanding of the distinction between animate and inanimate movement patterns. Lamsfuss (1995) showed 4 and 5 year olds a series of pairs of dot patterns, one regular and one irregular, that they said were tracks left by either animals or machines. The children were shown to make the same correct responses as the adults and biology experts in the control condition.

Experiments have also shown that children can make the animate/inanimate distinction regarding self-generated movement. In essence, young children can understand that animate objects have the ability to move deliberately and independently, whereas the movement of inanimate objects must involve the actions of an external force. For example, 3 and 4 year olds were able to look at pictures from two animate categories (mammals and non-mammals) and three inanimate categories (statues, wheeled objects and complex rigid objects) and successfully state which would be able to move up and down a hill on their own (Massey and Gelman, 1988). The animate/inanimate distinction made here was based on more than simple perceptual information, as the animate objects were never pictured moving, and their legs were seldom evident. Moreover, of the inanimate objects the statues displayed many of the same perceptual categories as the animate objects. One implication of the findings from all of these mo

a computer. These were then presented in series along with the same movement patterns minus occlusions, and random light patterns (with and without occlusions). Using a habituation/dishabituation system of analysis it was shown that these young infants recognized the human movement as distinct from the other movements shown (Bertenthal et al, 1985). Predictability and regularity have also been shown to form the basis of children's understanding of the distinction between animate and inanimate movement patterns. Lamsfuss (1995) showed 4 and 5 year olds a series of pairs of dot patterns, one regular and one irregular, that they said were tracks left by either animals or machines. The children were shown to make the same correct responses as the adults and biology experts in the control condition.

Experiments have also shown that children can make the animate/inanimate distinction regarding self-generated movement. In essence, young children can understand that animate objects have the ability to move deliberately and independently, whereas the movement of inanimate objects must involve the actions of an external force. For example, 3 and 4 year olds were able to look at pictures from two animate categories (mammals and non-mammals) and three inanimate categories (statues, wheeled objects and complex rigid objects) and successfully state which would be able to move up and down a hill on their own (Massey and Gelman, 1988). The animate/inanimate distinction made here was based on more than simple perceptual information, as the animate objects were never pictured moving, and their legs were seldom evident. Moreover, of the inanimate objects the statues displayed many of the same perceptual categories as the animate objects. One implication of the findings from all of these mo

ng self-generated movement. In essence, young children can understand that animate objects have the ability to move deliberately and independently, whereas the movement of inanimate objects must involve the actions of an external force. For example, 3 and 4 year olds were able to look at pictures from two animate categories (mammals and non-mammals) and three inanimate categories (statues, wheeled objects and complex rigid objects) and successfully state which would be able to move up and down a hill on their own (Massey and Gelman, 1988). The animate/inanimate distinction made here was based on more than simple perceptual information, as the animate objects were never pictured moving, and their legs were seldom evident. Moreover, of the inanimate objects the statues displayed many of the same perceptual categories as the animate objects. One implication of the findings from all of these movement researches is that the children could look at perceptual differences in movement and infer that animate objects movement is unpredictable as it more than mere locomotion, but rather the result of a series of mental processes. Another is that they had categorical knowledge of animate and inanimate objects that let them recognize members of the two categories and resultantly predict their function and behavior.

The extremely young age at which some basic knowledge of the animate/inanimate distinction has been displayed (as young as 5 months) also supports the theory that biological information is at least to some extent inherent. At this age there have been very little time and limited cognitive resources for this sort of information to have been learned. Thus it has been suggested that humans are born with some sort of conceptual framework of biological knowledge that gets expanded upon and refined as the child grows and has more experiences. Thus evidence of the animate/inanimate distinction in children can have important implications on the 'nature verses nurture' debate that is prevalent in many areas of developmental psychology.

Another area of study that exemplifies children's understanding of the animate/inanimate distinction is that of the assumption of shared core properties (Goswami, 1998). It could be said that whereas the exterior of an object can help understanding of its form and function, the inside is a strong indicator of the object's nature. In one such study 3 and 4 year olds were shown three pictures at a time and were then asked questions based on the interior or exterior of the objects shown, such as 'which has the same insides as x?' or 'which looks the same as x?' (x being the subject of the first of every three pictures presented). The triads used consisted of one animate object (x), one perceptually similar inanimate object and one perceptually dissimilar (but internally similar animate object e.g. a pig, a piggy bank and a cow. Accuracy of both ages in answering the questions was significantly above chance levels, but the 4 year olds were seen to perform much better (with 78% accuracy compared to 58% in the 3 year olds)(Gelman and Wellman, 1991). These findings can be used to further support the idea that children's understanding of the animate/inanimate distinction gets better and more explicit with age. From this it can also be seen to support the implication that the biological knowledge a child has (and thus their conceptual categorization as a whole) is honed through and refined through experience.

Similar experiments have been used to suggest that even the younger children often display some abstract knowledge about the composition of animate and inanimate things, despite not having any direct ('concrete') experience. Simons and Keil (1995) used a puppet character to engage children of 3, 4 and 5 years, which asked them to 'help him' differentiate from a group of pictures which objects had 'real insides'. A number of conditions were used; the first involved the pictures being presented in pairs (one animate and one inanimate subject) and the children having to indicate which had the real insides. The second had the pictures being presented individually and the children indicating which of three glass containers held the most accurate representation of the insides of the item. One jar had biological matter in it, one had machinery parts, and the third contained a hybrid, involving rocks suspended in a colored gelatin substance. What the results of this experiment showed was that children (esp